This study investigated how 50 preschool children (25 girls, 25 boys) evaluated the appropriateness of excluding boys and girls from two types of activities (doll play, truck play) and two types of future roles (playing a teacher, playing a firefighter) across different exclusion contexts. Children judged straightforward exclusion from activities on the basis of gender as wrong, even if the child's gender was stereotypical of the activity. Furthermore, they justified these decisions on the basis of moral reasons, such as equality and unfairness. Children used a mixture of moral and social conventional reasoning (including stereotypes), however, to evaluate multifaceted situations that called for judgments about both inclusion and exclusion and that included information about the children's past experience with the activity.
might be willing to apply their stereotypes to justify the exclusion of children from play activities (such as excluding a boy from playing with dolls) because they would see this exclusion as legitimate on the basis of their knowledge about gender stereotypes and their preference for same-gender peers. Gender stereotypes represent one type of social conventional reasoning that may (or may not) be used to justify exclusion in such situations (Carter & Patterson, 1982; Stoddart & Turiel, 1985) . Social-cognitive domain research has shown that children evaluate gender stereotypes using social conventional, not moral, justifications (Stoddart & Turiel, 1985) .
Social-cognitive domain research has also shown that children as young as AVi years of age evaluate moral transgressions, such as hitting, not sharing, and teasing, by focusing on others' welfare, rights, and fairness (referred to as negative intrinsic consequences to others; for reviews, see Smetana, 1995; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987) . As an example, children evaluate hitting another child as wrong because of the physical harm to the other person ("It's wrong to hit someone because they'll get hurt and feel sad"). Evaluations of teasing are judged to be wrong because of the psychological harm to another (see Helwig, 1995) . On the basis of the social-cognitive domain model, one might predict that children would see exclusion on the basis of gender as unfair or harmful and thus not condone it.
Relatively little is currently known about how children evaluate the appropriateness of exclusion from activities on the basis of gender and how and when children's stereotypic judgments might influence such decisions. Although a few studies have been conducted on peer-group entry strategies (see Putallaz & Wasserman, 1990 , for a review), none that we are aware of has examined children's evaluations of acts of exclusion from a group on the basis of group membership. Thus, the aim of the present study was to investigate the contexts in which preschool-aged children would judge it all right or not all right for girls and boys to exclude someone from an activity on the basis of gender stereotypes.
We interviewed young children regarding their beliefs about the appropriateness of excluding children, on the basis of their gender, from stereotypical peer-group activities. We designed a baseline context to study whether children treated straightforward exclusion solely on the basis of gender as a moral transgression. In this baseline context, a group of same-gender children (e.g., a group of boys) were considering excluding a child of the other gender (a girl) from a gender-stereotypic activity (e.g., playing with trucks) solely on the basis of his or her gender and without any other provided justification. The baseline context thus provided a measure in which children's judgments about exclusion were assessed when there were no other competing considerations.
In the multifaceted contexts, children were asked to pick one of two children to join the group in cases in which there were only enough toys for one child to play. In the equal experience context, the same-gender peer group had to make a decision regarding whether to include a boy or a girl, each of whom was said to have had prior experience with the activity. In the unequal experience context, the same-gender peer group had to make a similar decision between allowing a boy or girl to join, but the same-gender child was said to have had prior experience with the activity, and the opposite-gender child was said to have had no prior experience (e.g., the boy had played with trucks before but the girl had not).
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These contexts were multifaceted both because a decision with a negative outcome (e.g., exclusion of a child who did not fit the stereotype) had to be weighed against a decision with a positive outcome (e.g., inclusion of a child who did fit the stereotype) and because additional judgment-relevant information was given about the children's prior experience with the activity.
The dependent measures were judgments of the appropriateness of exclusion (in the baseline context) and choices about which child to include (in the multifaceted contexts). Ratings of responses to the question "How bad is it to exclude the child?" and justifications for the decisions were assessed in all three contexts. The justifications were categorized into those that related to moral and those that related to social conventional reasons. In addition, we investigated whether children used one specific type of social conventional reasoning-social stereotypes about the activities appropriate for boys and girls-when making their decisions (see Stoddart & Turiel, 1985) .
Our design allowed us to test several primary and two supplemental research hypotheses. In the baseline context, despite the presence of gender stereotypes, we expected that children would perceive gender-based exclusion as unfair and wrong and that they would justify these decisions with moral reasons (e.g., "It's not fair to exclude someone"). This prediction was based on findings in the social-cognitive developmental literature (Smetana, 1995; Tisak, 1995; Turiel et al., 1987) . In the equal experience context, in which the decision involved choosing one child over the other and in which the only information available to guide the decision was the gender stereotype, we expected children to choose to include the child for whom the activity was stereotypical and to justify this decision on the basis of social conventions, including stereotypes.
In the unequal experience context, in which children were told that the child for whom the activity was stereotypical also had more experience at the activity, we expected children to use a combination of moral and social conventional justifications. On the one hand, the literature on judgments about fairness and turn-taking (e.g., Ross & Conant, 1992; Smetana, 1995) suggests that children would use moral reasoning concerning issues of fairness (i.e., "Pick the boy because he has not had a chance to play with the dolls before"). On the other hand, the literature on gender stereotypes suggests that children would focus on gender stereotypes (i.e., "Pick the girl because girls know more about dolls and this boy has never played with dolls before"). Thus, we analyzed whether children would be more likely to focus on the fairness issue or on stereotypes in this context. Because the literature provides two alternative possibilities, there was no explicit hypothesis concerning which target child the participants would choose.
We also expected that children's justifications would be consistent with their judgments. We tested this hypothesis in two ways. First, we assessed differences in justifications across contexts. Children were expected to use primarily moral reasoning in the baseline context to support their judgments of inclusion (i.e., that the girls should include the boy to play dolls) and were expected to use primarily social conventional reasoning in the equal experience context (i.e., that the child who fit the stereotype should be included). A mixture of moral and social conventional reasoning was expected in the unequal experience context. Second, we tested the hypothesis that, across contexts, decisions about inclusion would be justified on the basis of moral reasoning and that decisions about exclusion would be justified on the basis of social conventional reasoning.
We also tested two secondary hypotheses. For one, we compared judgments about exclusion from gender-stereotypic activities (e.g., playing with dolls or trucks) with exclusion from genderstereotypic roles (e.g., deciding who will be the teacher or who will be the firefighter; see Albert & Porter, 1983; Kuhn et al., 1978) . We expected that children's stereotypes about activities would be strong and well-defined, given that gender-related activities are segregated throughout middle childhood (Maccoby, 1988 ). Yet children's conceptions of future roles were expected to be more flexible and thus less likely to be impacted by stereotypes. Although some work has shown that children are resistant to interventions to change stereotypic judgments (see Bigler & Liben, 1992) , other work has shown that by elementary school, children understand that most adult occupations are not gender specific (Garrett, Ein, & Tremaine, 1977) . On the basis of these prior findings, we expected that children would use social conventional reasoning, including stereotypes, more frequently for the play activities than for future roles. 1 We did not design a context in which the child who did not fit the stereotype had more experience at the activity because of the artificiality of this premise for children. In pilot work, we tested a design with three multifaceted contexts: equal experience (both children have the same experience at the activity), unequal experience A (the child who fits the stereotype has more experience), and unequal experience B (the child who does not fit the stereotype has more experience). We found that the latter context-unequal experience B-did not work because children did not accept this premise. For example, if we said that the boy had more experience with dolls than did the girl (and asked "Whom should you pick?"), the interviewees challenged the statement by telling the interviewer that girls, not boys, have more experience with dolls. Therefore, we were not able to pit gender against experience. We also found that describing four contexts (baseline plus three multifaceted contexts) to young children was too taxing. Thus, we elected to use three contexts: the baseline, equal experience, and unequal experience A. Although it would be of interest to test children's reactions to counterstereotypical suggestions, this was not the aim of our study.
Another secondary hypothesis was that children would be less likely to condone exclusion of children of their own gender than they would children of the other gender. It is commonly found that adults favor their own groups (e.g., by assigning them more rewards) over other groups (for reviews, see Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Messick & Mackie, 1989) . Although a few studies have shown that children demonstrate an in-group favoritism bias when allocating rewards (Damon, 1977; Yee & Brown, 1992) or when making a preference for different cultural groups (Bennett, Barrett, Lyons, & Sani, 1998) , we know of no studies that have examined whether children's judgments about exclusion are biased toward the in-group. Research has shown that young children play with same-gender partners more often than other-gender partners, indicating that they may demonstrate an in-group favoritism bias when making judgments about exclusion (i.e., that girls would judge it more wrong for boys to exclude a girl from an activity than would boys and that boys would judge it more wrong for girls to exclude a boy from an activity than would girls). Thus, a secondary hypothesis was that young children would demonstrate a bias toward the in-group when making judgments about exclusion.
Method

Participants
Participants were 25 boys and 25 girls enrolled in two preschools in a suburb of a large mid-Atlantic city. The mean age was 57.1 months (SD = 6.51, range = 48-70 months). Because there were no age or demographic differences between the two schools, all children were combined into one sample. The sample was predominantly European American (94%) and of a middle-class background, as indicated by information that the preschool directors supplied regarding parental income levels. Teachers had 4-year college degrees, and the average length of teaching was 13 years (range = 10-20 years). The teacher-child ratio was 1:10. Parental consent (85% return rate) was obtained for all children who participated.
Procedure
Children were interviewed individually by a female graduate research assistant during one session lasting approximately 20 min. The children were read four stories with accompanying 9'/2 X 11 in. (24 X 28 cm) picture cards. Two of the stories were about stereotypic activities (playing with dolls and playing with trucks), and the other two stories concerned stereotypic future roles (being a teacher or a firefighter; Albert & Porter, 1983; Kuhn et al., 1978) . Girls and boys each evaluated stories in which girls and boys had been excluded. The four stories were presented in a counterbalanced order.
In each story, a group of either boys or girls (in accordance with the stereotype in question) were playing and a child of the other gender wanted to play with them (e.g., a group of girls were playing dolls, and John wanted to play with them). The children were shown two different picture cards for each story, one card for the baseline context (e.g., showing John approaching the girls, who are playing dolls), and one card for the multifaceted contexts (e.g., showing John and Sally standing next to the peer group). It was not necessary to have two separate cards for the equal and unequal contexts because the only variable that changed between the contexts was the experience of the children who wanted to play. Pilot tests revealed that using the same picture card for the two multifaceted contexts made the interview less repetitious for the children, as it was no longer necessary to repeat all the information that was given in the equal experience context (i.e., two children, John and Sally, come over and want to play dolls).
For each story, children were asked about exclusion in three contexts. In the baseline context, children were asked whether it was all right to exclude the child for whom the activity was not stereotypical (e.g., John in the doll story). In the equal experience context, children were asked to choose either a boy or a girl to join the group in a situation in which there were only enough toys for one more person to play, and the children in the story were said to have had the same experience with the activity (e.g., both John and Sally have played dolls before). In the unequal experience context, the children were also asked to choose either a girl or a boy to join the group (with only room for one more), and they were told that only the child in adherence with the stereotype had played the activity before. The baseline context was always given first, followed by the descriptions of the equal experience and the unequal experience contexts.
The interview format is illustrated in this boy-excluded doll story (recall that the experimenter used picture cards to pose each question and pointed to the children depicted in the cards):
Baseline context. "A group of girls are playing with dolls. John comes over and asks if he can play. Two of the girls say that John cannot play because he is a boy. Is it all right or not all right for the girls to tell John that he can't play? Why/why not?"
Equal experience context. "Two children, John and Sally, come over and want to play dolls with the group of girls. There is only one doll left, and the group has to decide who to pick. Both John and Sally have played dolls before. Some children think they should pick John because boys don't normally play with dolls, and it would be fun to have a boy join the group. Some children think they should pick Sally because girls like to play with girls. Whom should the group pick? Why?"
Unequal experience context. "What if something different happened? Let's say that two children, John and Sally, come over and want to play dolls with the group of girls. There is only one doll left, and the group has to decide who to pick. This time Sally has played with dolls before and John has never played with dolls. Whom should the group pick? Why?" There were five dependent measures: judgment (yes-no response to the question "Is it all right or not all right not to let someone play?"), choice (answer to the question "Whom should the group pick?"), rating (response to the question "Is it bad or not bad if the children do not let John/Sally play?"), justification (response to the question "Why/Why not?"), and use of stereotype (the presence or absence of a stereotypic statement in the child's answer). All interviews were audiotape recorded and transcribed for analysis.
Coding and Reliability
For the baseline context, children's judgment responses received a score of 0 if they said it was all right to exclude someone and a 1 if they said it was not all right to exclude someone. For the two multifaceted contexts, children's choices received a score of 0 if they chose the child who fit the stereotype (e.g., Sally in the doll story) and 1 if they chose the child who did not fit the stereotype (e.g., John in the doll story).
The rating assessment was the same for all three contexts and consisted of a 4-point scale ranging from 1 {not bad) to 4 (very, very bad) (for similar methodologies, see Smetana, 1981; Tisak, 1995) . Children were shown a card with four faces of increasing size, ranging from not bad (small neutral face) to very, very bad (large frown face), and were asked to point to the face that reflected their judgment.
Children were also asked to give a justification for their decision in each context (e.g., "Why is it all right/not all right to not let someone play?" "Why should the group pick Sally/John?"). Children's justifications were coded as moral, social conventional, and "other" (no reason/"I don't know"). Because the overwhelming majority of children (94%) gave either a moral or a social conventional response, the "other" category was dropped from all analyses. These coding categories were derived from previous research on children's social and moral evaluations of social situations (Carter & Patterson, 1982; Killen, Breton, Ferguson, & Handler, 1994; Killen & Nucci, 1995; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Smetana, 1995) . The moral category included prosocial and fairness/equality categories. The social conventional category included gender expectations and gender stereotypes (see Carter & Patterson, 1982) and group identity (e.g., "Girls like to play with girls"). Gender stereotypes were categorized as social conventional on the basis of previous research (Carter & Patterson, 1982; Stoddart & Turiel, 1985) . All social conventional categories were genderrelated. These categories and examples are described in Table 1 . In this study, all children gave only one justification response; therefore there was no "double-coding" as is often the case with data collected on older children. The coding was conducted by two coders blind to the hypotheses of the study. On the basis of 25% of the interviews (N = 150 data points), Cohen's kappa was .85 for interrater reliability.
We conducted a separate coding for the presence or absence of a gender-stereotypic statement because we found that when analyzing children's responses, some stereotypes were used to support exclusion (e.g., "Boys don't play dolls; only girls play with dolls") and other stereotypes were used to reject exclusion (e.g., "Just because boys don't like to play with dolls doesn't mean that you can tell [him] to go away and not play with the dolls"). Therefore, each child's response received one of three mutually exclusive stereotype codes. These were (a) no stereotype used, (b) stereotype used to support exclusion, and (c) stereotype used to reject exclusion. Cohen's kappa was .91 for the stereotype coding, based on 25% of the interviews (N = 150 data points).
Results
Plan for Analysis
We analyzed each of the dependent measures (judgments, choices, ratings, justifications, and stereotypes) using repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs). The baseline context was analyzed separately from the multifaceted contexts. Means comparisons were conducted using Fisher's least significant difference comparisons (Winer, 1971 ) with a p value set at .05.
Baseline Context
Judgments and ratings. Our first research question involved determining whether children would judge exclusion in the baseline context as appropriate. We analyzed these judgments with a 2 (gender of child) X 4 (story) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. Means are presented in Table 2 . As expected, the majority of children did not condone exclusion but rather judged that it was wrong to exclude another child. Indeed, each of the total judgments presented in Table 2 was significantly greater than chance responding (.50) as assessed by F tests. This pattern was maintained for all stories-there were no main effects or interactions with story or gender of child.
The rating assessment ("Is it bad or not bad if the children do not let John/Sally play?") provided a secondary measure of how children evaluated exclusion. The mean rating was 3.20 on a 4-point scale (1 = not bad, 2 = bad, 3 = very bad, 4 = very, very bad). There were no main effects or interactions with story or gender of child.
Justifications. The proportion of moral and social conventional justifications given in the baseline context are also presented in Table 2 . A 2 (gender of child) X 4 (story) X 2 (justification: moral, social conventional) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors revealed only a significant main effect for type of justification, F(l, 48) = 4.77, p < .05. Children used more moral justifications (M = .58) than social conventional justifications (M = .36). Again, there were no main effects or interactions with story or gender of the child.
Multifaceted Contexts
Choices. Our hypotheses regarding multifaceted contexts were tested with a 2 (gender of the child) X 2 (context: equal experience, unequal experience) X 4 (story) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3 . Consistent with our expectation that children would be sensitive to the context of exclusion and that exclusion on the basis of stereotypes would be more condoned in the equal experience than in the unequal experience context, a significant main effect of context, F(l, 48) = 15.89, p < .0001, revealed that children chose to include the child who did not fit the stereotype (e.g., the girl for trucks) more often in the unequal experience context (M = .56) than in the equal experience context (Af = .39).
There was also a main effect of story, F(3,144) = 2.85, p < .04, showing that children chose the child who did not fit the stereotype more often for stories about future roles (M = .52) than for stories about activities (Af = .43). This main effect was, however, qualified by a Gender of Child X Story interaction, F(3, 144) = 4.42, p < .01, which showed that the difference between roles and activities was only significant for boys (Ms = .46 and .35, respec- 
Group identity
Other "It's not okay to leave him out because the girls aren't being nice. They should all be friends."
"If they said no, it wouldn't be fair. Girls can play with blocks, too"; "I think they should let John play with dolls because it's not fair to tell him no just because he's a boy."
"Boys don't play with dolls"; "Girls don't like trucks."
"Girls like playing with girls"; "Boys like to play trucks with boys, not girls." No response/"! don't know" Note. N = 50 (25 girls, 25 boys). a Proportion of "not all right" responses to "Is it all right or not all right for the girls/boys to tell John/Sally that he/she can't play?" b Responses to "Is it bad or not bad if the children do not let John/Sally play?" (1 = not bad; 2 = bad; 3 = very bad; 4 = very, very bad). ° Responses to "Why/Why not?" tively), not for girls (Ms = .58 and .52). Girls showed evidence of in-group favoritism by choosing the girl to participate significantly more often than did the boys in both the truck (Ms = .62 vs. .36) and firefighter stories (Ms = .68 vs. .38) for girls and boys, respectively. Boys, however, showed little evidence of in-group favoritism. Boys did not choose the boy (M = .34) more often than did the girls (M = .42) for the doll story, and they did not choose the boy (M = .54) more often than did the girls (M = .48) for the teacher role (neither of these comparisons was significant).
Ratings. A 2 (gender of child) X 2 (context) X 4 (story) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors was conducted on the ratings. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 4 . A main effect of context, F(l, 48) = 7.47, p < .01, showed that, overall, children rated exclusion of the child who did not fit the stereotype more negatively in the unequal experience (M = 2.9) than in the equal experience (M = 2.6) context. However, this was qualified by a Context X Story interaction, F(3, 144) = 2.98, p < .03, indicating that although children rated it as significantly "more bad" to exclude a girl from trucks and firefighters in the unequal contexts than in the equal contexts, there were no context distinctions made for the boy-excluded stories. Similar to results found in the choice data, a Story X Gender effect, F(3,144) = 2.97, p < .04, indicated that girls rated excluding a girl to be more bad than did boys in both the truck (Ms = 2.84 and 2.36 for girls and boys, respectively) and firefighter (Ms = 3.16 and 2.54 for girls and boys, respectively) stories (both ps < .01). However, boys did not rate exclusion of boys more negatively than the girls in either the doll (Ms = 2.76 and 2.68 for girls and boys, respectively) or the teacher (Ms = 2.68 and 2.86 for girls and boys, respectively) stories.
Justifications. A 2 (gender) X 2 (context) X 4 (story) X 2 (justification: moral, social conventional) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last three factors was conducted on the justification data. Means are presented in Table 5 . This analysis revealed the expected Justification X Context interaction, F(l, 48) = 34.24, p < .0001, showing that social conventional reasoning predominated in the equal experience context (in which the only available information was the stereotype) to a greater extent than it did in the unequal context. Children used significantly more social conventional than moral justifications in the equal experience context Note. N = 50 (25 girls, 25 boys). The choice question was "Whom should the group pick?" (0 = stereotyped child, 1 = nonstereotyped child). (Ms = .64 and .24, respectively, p < .001) but more moral than social conventional justifications in the unequal experience context (Ms = .51 and .39, respectively, p < .001).
Analyses also revealed a significant Gender of Child X Story X Justification interaction, F(3, 144) = 4.20, p < .01. This interaction showed that girls used more moral than social conventional justifications for the girl-excluded stories (the truck story and the firefighter story; Ms = .50 vs. 40 and .48 vs. 36 for moral and social conventional reasoning, respectively), although neither of these comparisons was significant. Boys used more social conventional than moral justifications for these stories (Ms = .32 vs. .62 and .28 vs. .66 for moral and social conventional reasoning, respectively); this comparison was significant for the truck story only. Yet both girls and boys used more social conventional than moral justifications for the boy-excluded stories (for the doll story and the teacher story, Ms = .34 vs. .56 and .34 vs. .46 for moral and social conventional reasoning, respectively, for girls, and Ms = .32 vs. .56 and .42 vs. .48, respectively, for boys). These results indicate that girls tended to view stories in which girls were excluded (truck and firefighter) as issues of unfairness more often than did boys, and boys did not differentiate between girl-excluded and boy-excluded stories.
Relations between choice and justification. As a secondary test of the relation between judgments and justifications, we assessed the types of justifications given by children who chose to include the child who fit, as opposed to the child who did not fit, the stereotype. As expected, the majority of children showed a relation between their choices and their justifications. In the equal experience context, 99% of the children who chose the child that fit the stereotype (e.g., Sally for dolls) did so for social conventional reasons (1% used moral reasons); however, of the children who chose the child that did not fit the stereotype (e.g., John for Note. N = 50 (25 girls, 25 boys). Responses were to the question "Why?" regarding children's choices of whom the group should pick. Note. N = 50 (25 girls, 25 boys). dolls), 61% used moral justifications and 39% used social conventional justifications. In the unequal experience context, 96% of the children who picked the child who fit the stereotype used social conventional justifications, and only 4% used moral justifications. Conversely, the majority of children, 87%, who chose the child who did not fit the stereotype used moral justifications, and only 13% used social conventional reasons.
Stereotypes as Justifications for Inclusion or Exclusion
Although the previous analyses showed that social conventional reasoning was used more frequently to justify decisions of exclusion than inclusion, it remains to be determined whether those social conventional justifications actually involved the use of gender stereotypes.
2 To assess this question, we analyzed the stereotype measure. Across all three contexts, about half of the children (M = .52) used no stereotypes at all, and less than half used stereotypes to support exclusion (M = .27) or to reject exclusion (Af = .21).
Baseline context. We analyzed the use of stereotypes in the baseline context with a 2 (gender of child) X 3 (stereotype use: none, support, reject) X 4 (story) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors. The results are shown in Table 6 . A significant main effect of stereotype use, F(2, 96) = 4.15, p < .02, indicated that children were more likely not to use any stereotypes at all (M = .41) than to use them either to reject exclusion (M = .34) or to support exclusion (M = .26). Thus, as expected, in the baseline context only a minority of the children used stereotypes to support exclusion.
Multifaceted contexts. In the multifaceted contexts, analyses revealed both a significant main effect of stereotype use, F(2, 96) = 38.81, p < .0001, as well as a Stereotype Use X Context interaction, F(2, 96) = 22.16, p < .0001. Again, most children did not use stereotypes at all (A/ = .57). In these contexts a greater proportion of children used stereotypes to support exclusion (M = .29) than to reject exclusion (M = .14), p < .01. The Stereotype Use X Context interaction showed that, as expected, there was a greater tendency to use stereotypes overall in the equal experience context (Af = .58) than in the unequal experience context (M = .27), p < .01. The tendency to use stereotypes to reject rather than to support exclusion did not, however, vary by context or story.
Discussion
Although prior research has made it clear that young children possess stereotypes about the appropriate activities for boys and girls (Liben & Signorella, 1993; Ruble & Martin, 1998) , research has not heretofore studied the extent to which these beliefs are used to justify the exclusion of children from stereotype-related activities. Our research used the social-cognitive domain model (Smetana, 1995; Tisak, 1995; Turiel et al., 1987) to provide a theoretical basis for predicting when stereotypes might or might not be used to condone such exclusion. Supporting the utility of this model, and consistent with our hypotheses, was our finding that children's judgments about exclusion were quite consistent with the social reasoning they used when making the decision. Judgments of inclusion were generally based on moral reasoning, whereas judgments of exclusion were generally based on social conventional reasoning, including social stereotypes (see Killen & Stangor, in press ).
In terms of the contexts in which exclusion is condoned, our data show that young children did not use their stereotypes to justify exclusion from peer-group play activities, except in situa-tions in which the stereotype was the only information upon which to base the decision (the equal experience context). In the baseline context, in which there was no basis for exclusion from an activity except that the activity was not stereotypic for the child, the majority of the children judged that exclusion on the basis of gender was wrong, and they justified these decisions primarily in terms of the principles of equality and unfairness. These results are quite similar to those of prior research showing that young children evaluate straightforward or "prototypic" moral transgressions as wrong due to the violation of others' welfare or fairness (Killen, 1991; Killen et al., 1994; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981 Smetana, , 1995 Turiel, 1983 Turiel, , 1998 , One difference, however, was that the baseline exclusion in this study involved a category-gender roles-about which children have strong social conventional beliefs (see Carter & Patterson, 1982; Stoddart & Turiel, 1985) . This may explain why only 60-70% of the children judged exclusion to be wrong, in contrast to the 80-100% that is frequently found for judgments about straightforward moral transgressions, such as not sharing toys, unprovoked hitting, and teasing (Smetana, 1995; Tisak, 1995) . Indeed, our stereotype data show that, whereas the majority of children viewed exclusion based on a stereotype to be wrong, some children nevertheless used their stereotypes to justify exclusion even in the baseline context. Thus, overall, stereotypes were not used to condone exclusion in the baseline context, although some children did so. An important topic for future research is to determine which children do, and which children do not, use stereotypes to condone exclusion.
Only in a situation in which the child had to choose between two children who both had prior experience with the activity, and thus in which only the stereotype provided relevant information (the equal experience context), did most children rely on social conventional reasoning to justify exclusion. However, even in this case, in which stereotypes were made salient, the majority of the children did not use stereotypes to justify their decision. In almost as many cases, children used stereotypes but then rejected them as a basis of exclusion. As an illustration, one 4-year-old girl said, "Just because boys don't like dolls doesn't mean they should tell him to leave. Boys can play with dolls, too."
The unequal experience context provided a situation in which stereotypes were pitted against another form of reasoning on the basis of fairness and turn-taking (e.g., Ross & Conant, 1992; Smetana, 1995) . Although we did not make specific predictions about which type of reasoning would prevail in this context, as hypothesized we found that a mixture of social-conventional and moral justifications were used in this context. The results suggest that children, particularly girls, viewed the decision primarily as an issue of fairness and turn-taking (e.g., Ross & Conant, 1992; Smetana, 1995) . All of the girls, and most of the boys (for the teacher and firefighter stories) chose the child with less experience even though the activity was inconsistent with the child's gender role. This is an interesting finding because it demonstrates the extent to which competing considerations can prevent the use of stereotypes when making a decision about whom to include in a group activity. Even in the case in which the prior experience of the child reinforced the stereotype, children still focused on other variables (e.g., turn-taking) to make their decision.
In terms of differences in perceptions of roles and activities, we found that boys, but not girls, were more willing to exclude on the basis of stereotypes regarding activities (playing with dolls or trucks) than to exclude on the basis of stereotypes regarding roles (playing a teacher or a firefighter). Little research has been conducted on the difference between stereotypes about activities and roles (although some work has shown that children are resistant to changing stereotyped views about future occupations; see Bigler & Liben, 1992) . Kuhn et al. (1978) distinguished between activities and roles in their analysis of gender-role concepts in young children but did not report any differences between these two types of stereotypes. Prior research has shown that children's play during the preschool years is highly gender segregated (Maccoby, 1988) . Thus, children may witness more differentiated play regarding toy use (e.g., dolls and trucks), and these observations may influence their judgments about gender-associated interactions. Further, attempting to dispel stereotypes regarding future roles (e.g., who you can be "when you grow up") may be a more pressing agenda for parents and teachers than attempting to dispel stereotypes regarding interactions with toys. Adults may encourage doll play for girls and truck play for boys while indicating that future roles should not be gender designated (e.g., "boys can be teachers; girls can be firefighters"). These types of adult influences may contribute to children's inferences about when exclusion based on gender stereotypes is all right or not all right. Only further research can provide an explanation for why and how children distinguish between different forms of gender stereotypes.
We found some support for our prediction regarding in-group bias (Bennett et al., 1998; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Yee & Brown, 1992) , but it appeared only for girls. In the baseline condition, in which norms of fairness prevailed for all children, there was no evidence for in-group favoritism. In the multifaceted contexts, however, girls chose the girl to participate in both the truck and firefighter stories more often than did the boys and also rated excluding a girl in the truck and firefighter stories to be "more bad" than did the boys. Boys, on the other hand, did not choose the boy to participate in the dolls and teacher stories more than girls. The justification data confirm that girls tended to view stories in which girls were excluded (the truck and firefighter stories) as issues of unfairness more often than did boys.
These findings represent an extension of typical in-group favoritism findings. In prior research, in-group favoritism has referred to giving preferential treatment to one's own group (e.g., allocating more rewards to one's own group than to another group). In this study, in-group favoritism was manifested as the judgment that exclusion of one's own group is more wrong than exclusion of the other group (e.g., that one's own group has been treated more unfairly than another group). It is not clear why this pattern only occurred for girls, although the reason may be related to differential perceptions of the appropriateness of cross-gender activities. Research has shown that girls are more often excluded from activities by boys than boys are excluded from activities by girls (Maccoby, 1988) . Therefore, it is possible that the results reflect an increased sensitivity on the part of girls about exclusion of girls from male activities. In addition, children have been found to judge boys' cross-gender behavior as more wrong than girls' cross-gender behavior (Levy, Taylor, & Gelman, 1995) , making it less likely that both boys and girls would view boys' exclusion from dolls, for example, as an issue of unfairness. More research is warranted to understand these findings in light of the in-group favoritism literature.
Two limitations of this study are worth noting. First, we did not have a scenario in which stereotypes were pitted against experience. In the unequal experience, children were interviewed about inclusion when the child who fit the stereotype also had more experience at the activity than the child who did not fit the stereotype. We did not interview children about an unequal experience context in which the child who did not fit the stereotype had more experience. This context was not included because we had found in pilot testing that children would not accept the premise that a child who did not fit the stereotype had more experience (see Footnote 1). Thus, we do not know whether gender stereotypes would have been relevant for young children in this context.
A second limitation pertains to potential interpretations of the information provided to the children in the equal experience contexts. In the unequal experience contexts, children were explicitly told that only the child who fit the stereotype had played the activity before. In the equal experience contexts we only indicated that both children had played the activity. It is possible that children's stereotype expectations might have led them to interpret this to mean not that the two children had had exactly equal experience but rather that the child for whom the activity was stereotypic had actually had more experience. Prior research concerning the impact of gender schematic processing on interpretation of information (see Ruble & Martin, 1998) suggests that this might have occurred, and thus results from this context should be interpreted in this light.
Finally, although this study provided evidence for young children's judgments about exclusion based on gender stereotyping, more research should be designed to examine the developmental trajectory of this phenomenon, as well as to study judgments regarding other categories, such as race and ethnicity (see Aboud, 1992; Killen & Stangor, in press ). It is anticipated that studies designed to examine children's judgments about intergroup relationships will provide information that could potentially be used to help ameliorate intergroup conflict.
